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Article 263(4) TFEU and the Impossibility
of Challenging Recovery Decisions in State
Aid
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Elementare Maria Montessori v European Commission
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The Ferracci and Montessori judgments of the General Court of 15 September 2016 were
challenges brought against a Commission Decision scrutinising Italian municipal tax rules
allowing tax exemptions for non-commercial bodies. The cases raise issues of when third
party standing is allowed under Article 264(4) TFEU, the standard of review of European
Commission Decisions, the concept of economic and non-economic activity and when the
European Commission may decide that it is impossible for a Member State to recover ille-
gal State aid.
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I. Introduction
TheFerracci andMontessori 1 judgments of theGen-
eral Court of 15 September 2016 were challenges
brought against a Commission Decision2 scrutinis-
ing Italian municipal tax rules allowing tax exemp-
tions for non-commercial bodies. The applicants
had made earlier complaints in 2006 arguing that
illegal State aid was present in the Italian provi-
sions which granted an exemption from themunic-
ipal tax on real estate and a corporate tax reduction
to entities that were seen as non-commercial enti-
ties (including ecclesiastical bodies) and as such
were deemed not to be carrying out economic ac-
tivities.
The European Commission found that certain tax
exemptions did not constitute State aid, but in one
instance an exemption was found to constitute un-
lawful State aid where it related to activities involv-
ing real estate and the entities were engaged, in part,
in economic activities. But, for technical reasons the
European Commission found that this was an excep-
tional case and that it was impossible for Italy to re-
cover the illegal State aid.
The judgments cover a wide range of State aid
issues, making them noteworthy. The most impor-
tant aspect is the outcome: that even when aggriev-
ed third parties are able to satisfy the strict stand-
ingprovisions ofArticle 263(4)TFEU, theEuropean
Courts are still very reluctant to interfere with the
European Commission’s powers to interpret and
implement the State aid provisions. The rulings al-
so raise issues of how the European Commission
and the General Court address the economic/non-
economic activity bright line which determines
when the economic rules of the TFEU apply, espe-
* Erika Szyszczak, Professor of Law at University of Sussex, Barris-
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1 Case T‑219/13 Pietro Ferracci v European Commission [2016]
ECLI-485. On appeal: Case C-624/16 P. See also T-220/13 Scuola
Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission [2016] ECLI-484. On
appeal: Case C-622/16 P and Case C-263/16 P.
2 European Commission, Decision of 19 December 2012 on State
aid SA.20829 (C 26/2010, ex NN 43/2010 (ex CP 71/2006)),
Scheme concerning the municipal real estate tax exemption
granted to real estate used by non-commercial entities for specific
purposes implemented by Italy, available at: <http://curia.europa
.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=183333
&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1
&cid=155618> Last accessed on 6 December 2016.
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cially where State aid may be present, and, finally,
the question of when illegal State aid is not capa-
ble of recovery. These aspects of the judgments are
remarkable since they appear to go against the
grain of current European Commission decision-
making and European Court jurisprudence. This
annotation addresses the threemain issues of: first,
locus standi of third parties before the European
Courts; second, the line between economic and
non-economic activity in determining when the
State aid rules apply; third, the rules on when it is
impossible for a Member State to recover illegal
State aid.
II. Access to Justice: Article 263(4) TFEU
Access to justice is viewed as a fundamental right
in EU law. Recent years have seen a growth in chal-
lenges to the behaviour and exercise of powers of
the European Commission in competition law cas-
es using fundamental rights concepts.3This reliance
on fundamental rights concepts is facilitated by spe-
cific procedural rules and guarantees in Regulation
1/20034 and, it is arguable, that the recent resort to
fundamental rights concepts is making some in-
roads into the wide discretion normally attributed
to the European Commission to investigate breach-
es of competition law in the EU.5 In State aid litiga-
tion the focus of access to justice litigation is slight-
ly different in that the legal issues usually concern
third party (usually competitors) rights to challenge
European Commission State aid Decisions, and
their task is often made easier when they have ini-
tiated complaints and participated into the formal
procedures and investigative process. In cases
where such participation in the stages of the formal
procedures is not prominent, it is difficult for third
parties to challenge European Commission Deci-
sions.
III. The Standing of Third Parties to
Challenge European Commission
Decisions
The Treaty of Lisbon 2007 attempted to liberalise the
narrow rules of standing found in the original EEC
Treaty which applied to natural and legal persons to
challenge acts of the EU Institutions. This aim was
implemented by amending Article 263(4) TFEU to
allow any natural or legal person to institute proceed-
ings against a regulatory act which is of direct con-
cern to them and does not entail implementing mea-
sures:
“Any natural or legal person may, under the condi-
tions laid down in the first and second paragraphs,
institute proceedings against an act addressed to
that person or which is of direct and individual con-
cern to them, and against a regulatory act which is
of direct concern to them and does not entail im-
plementing measures.”
At face value this new wording eases up on the
earlier requirement for an applicant to show, the
almost impossible, requirement that a regulatory
act is of individual concern according to the Plau-
mann formula.6 But there is still the requirement
to show the applicant is directly concerned by a
measure.
Post-Lisbon applicants have not hadmuch success
in satisfying this new element of the standing test.
In relation to State aid acts the CJEU has dismissed
the application on various grounds. For example, in
Mory 7 the Court found that the decision was not an
act of general application. In other cases such as Tele-
fonica 8 theCourt found that implementingmeasures
3 Greater reliance of fundamental rights concepts in legal proceed-
ings is also triggered by the criminalisation of anti-competitive
behaviour at the national level.
4 The most prominent fundamental rights provisions in EU law are
found in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, OJ C 326/ 02. The provisions which are relevant for
challenging European Commission Decisions in competition law
are the following: Article 7 (respect for private and family life,
equivalent to Article 8 ECHR); Article 16 (freedom to conduct a
business); Article 17 (equivalent to A1P1 ECHR); Article 41 (right
to good administration); Article 47 (right to effective remedy and
to fair trial); Article 48 (presumption of innocence; respect for
rights of defence); Article 49(3) (proportionality of criminal penal-
ties).
5 See, for e.g. the judgment of the ECtHR of September 2011
Menarini Diagnostics v Italy, No 43509/08; Case C-272/09 P KME
Germany AG v Commission [2011] ECLI-810; Case C-386/10P
Chalkor v Commission [2011] ECLI-815; Case C-199/11 Europese
Gemeenschap v Otis NV and Others [2012] ECLI-684.
6 Case C-25/62 Plaumann & Co. v Commission of the European
Economic Community [1963] ECLI-17. In State aid cases it makes
a huge difference whether the third party applicant is challenging
a European Commission Decision at the phase 1 Decision, or as
is the case of Ferracci and Montessori, at the phase 2 stage of
challenge after the formal Decision has been taken. At this stage
the applicant becomes an interested third party where the restric-
tive Plaumann formula applies.
7 Case C-33/14 P Mory v Commission [2015] ECLI-609.
8 Case C-274/12 Telefonica v Commission [2013] ECLI-852. 
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were required.9 Thus, Ferracci and Montessori are
rare cases where the new admissibility criteria of Ar-
ticle 263(4) TFEU were satisfied.
Article 263(4) TFEU was satisfied because there
was a regulatory act to challenge thatwas legally com-
plete. The General Court held that the Italian mea-
sureswere applicable to situations determined objec-
tively with legal effects for general categories of un-
dertakings; the Commission Decision was of gener-
al application and could be classified as a regulatory
act. The General Court also took into account the fact
that the European Commission’s Decision was final
and binding upon Italy, and did not entail any imple-
menting measures.
On the direct concern point the General Court
found that the applicants could show that they were
directly concerned by the contestedDecision because
of their competitive relationships with the undertak-
ings which were the beneficiaries of the contested
tax exemptions.
IV. Economic and Non-Economic Activity
The legal issue of determining the bright line be-
tween economic and non-economic activity arose in
the context of the extent of the recovery of illegal
State aid. In order to obtain tax exemptions, a non-
commercial entity had to show that it was engaged
in non-economic activities. However, the Italian sys-
tem did not create a structure where a beneficiary of
the tax concession was able to show the mix of eco-
nomic and non-economic activities. Overall, the Ital-
ian authorities argued that the entities in question
were not undertakings because their activities main-
ly targeted very specific categories of recipients. The
activities did not constitute an offer of goods or ser-
vices on the market and thus were not in competi-
tionwith the activities carried out by commercial un-
dertakings. In most cases the activities had specific
social characteristics, for example, they were per-
formed in the public interest or for solidarity purpos-
es, were either free of charge or services were provid-
ed for reduced fees. The European Commission was
not able to discern if, or what proportion of, the pre-
vious activitywas economic or non-economic. In this
situation it was not possible for the European Com-
mission to find positive evidence that there was eco-
nomic activity taking place in the past and that the
tax concessions gave an undertaking a selective ad-
vantage for the purposes of satisfying the State aid
rules.10
The General Court examined the reform of the ex-
emption in Italian lawwhich tightened up the tax ex-
emptions by applying them to only non-economic ac-
tivities. As recent case law and Decisions of the Eu-
ropean Commission reveal, it is not easy to apply a
clear bright line to non-economic activities, especial-
lywhere there aremixed economic and non-econom-
ic activities andwhere an entity is able to ask for pay-
ment for any ancillary services provided.11 In the
Montessori case the entities were allowed to charge
small, or nominal, amounts for their services, and
economic activities were not prohibited.
9 In other cases the CJEU has applied this wording strictly. See Case
C-456/13 P T and L where Regulations setting out exceptional
import tariffs on sugar left no implementing discretion to the
national authorities but the CJEU held that the Regulations pro-
duced legal effects only through the intermediary of the acts of
the national authorities. See also: Case C-132/12P Stichting
Woonpunt, [2014] ECLI-100; Case T-276/13 Growth Energy
[2016] ECLI-340; Case T-57/11 Castelnou, [2014] ECLI-1021;
Case T-614/13 Romonta [2014] ECLI-835; Case T-287/11
Heitkamp [2016] ECLI-60. See also Case C-541/14 P Royal Scan-
dinavian Casino v Commission [2016] ECLI-302 and Case
T-238/14 EGBA and RGA v Commission [2016] ECLI-259. This
line of case law suggests that the Treaty of Lisbon 2007 amend-
ment has not increased access to the Court of Justice of the
European Union, and indeed may be even more difficult to
satisfy than the pre-Lisbon test.
10 Montessori (n 1), [106].
11 See, for example EC Decision SA 27301. Here the European
Commission accepted that Dutch Nature Management Organisa-
tions (NMO) were not involved in economic activities when they
were carrying out their nature conservation tasks, but that rev-
enue generating activities of the NMO were economic activities
and this made the NMO undertakings carrying out an economic
activity. See E Szyszczak, ‘Survey Services of General Economic
Interest and State Measures Affecting Competition’ (2016) 7 (7)
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 501. Some
guidance on what proportion of ancillary economic activity of a
non-commercial entity is acceptable is now found in the procure-
ment rules, for e.g. Article 12 of Directive 2014/24, OJ 2014 L
94/65 allows in-house entities to develop 20% of their services or
goods in the market and still be considered under the control of
the contracting authority for the purposes of the direct award of
contracts. Whether this excludes the existence of State aid or not
is unclear: for a critical discussion, see G Skovgaard Ølykke and
C Fanøe Andersen, ‘A State Aid Perspective on Certain Elements
of Article 12 of the New Public Sector Directive on In-house
Provision’ (2015) 1 Public Procurement Law Review, 1; G Skov-
gaard Ølykke, ‘Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid as
Referred to in Art. 107(1) TFEU: Is the Conduct of a Public Pro-
curement Procedure Sufficient to Eliminate the Risk of Granting
State Aid?’ (2016) 5 Public Procurement Law Review, 5197. [My
thanks to Albert Sanchez-Graells for discussing this point with
me].
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The Court reiterates its position that the fact that
the supply of goods and services is made ​​on a non-
profit basis does not prevent the supplier from being
consideredas anundertakingwhere it competeswith
other operators who pursue profit.12 The Court also
noted that new tax rules were introduced to ensure
that if the propertywas formixed use, the tax exemp-
tion applied only to the part of it which was used for
non-economic activities.13
The Court took a formal approach to identifying
a set of indicators which were evidence that the tax
exemption could apply to non-economic activities.
These indicators included the not-for-profit nature of
the activities,14 the fact that the entities were not in-
herently in competitionwithundertakings operating
on a for-profit basis. Other indicators were drawn
from an examination of the statutes of the entities.
For example, the statutes prohibited the distribution
of some profits (or operating surpluses); any profits
had to be reinvested in activities that contributed to
social solidarity.Where a non-commercial entity was
dissolved its assets had to be transferred to another
non-commercial entity.
In theMontessori case, where entities operated in
the education sector, specific conditions were im-
posed: the activities had to be of a quality compara-
ble to that of public education and the school had to
operate a non-discriminatory entry policy for stu-
dents; a school had to accommodate students with
disabilities; the school had to provide for the publi-
cation of its accounts; education had to be provided
free of charge or for a nominal amount covering on-
ly a proportion of the actual cost of the service.15
The General Court emphasises the commercial ne-
gotiation side of remuneration when it constitutes
consideration for a service. This aspect of negotiation
is missing in the provision of a national system of
universal education. Thus, in the situation inMontes-
sori, the ecclesiastical bodieswere not acting in a com-
mercial sense but merely fulfilling public duties to-
wards the population. The nature of the activity was
not affected by the fact that pupils occasionally were
asked topaycertain fees inorder tocontribute to some
extent to the system’s operating costs.16 This aspect
of the ruling shows the tension between the EU lev-
el approach of defining an undertaking and econom-
ic activity according to a functional set of criteria and
what appears to operate in practice; deciding cases in
the national context in determining whether there is
a market and that economic activity takes place.
V. Impossibility of Recovery of Illegal
State Aid
As is often the case, having opened the door to ac-
cess the Court the door was quickly slammed shut in
dismissing the substantive grounds of appeal. The
General Court confirmed that the EuropeanCommis-
sion could make a finding of impossibility of recov-
ery in the final Decision where a Member State had
explained the reasons for such a conclusion during
the formal investigation.
In finding that the European Commission had not
erred in deciding that Italy could not, and therefore
should not, recover the illegal State aid at the formal
investigation stage of the procedure the General
Court upholds the European Commission Decision
not to order the Member State to attempt recovery
of the State aid. In previous case law aMember State
that pleads ‘absolute impossibility’ normally has to
show that it has tried to recover the aid.17 The rea-
sons adduced as towhy impossibility arises have var-
ied from constitutional to political reasons. What is
unusual in the Ferraci and Montessori cases is that
the impossibility of recovery arises because it was a
fault of the Italian administrative system that did not
foresee the need to separate out economic and non-
economic activities for tax purposes in the creation
and administration of the public registers and data
bases. The Italian system did not impose any obliga-
tions upon the non-commercial entities to separate
out their activities, or even to show that they satis-
fied the basic rule that their operations were primar-
ily non-economic in order to qualify for the tax ex-
emptions.18 The Italian tax register and data base
were structured in such a way that it would be im-
12 Montessori (n 1), [133].
13 Montessori (n 1), [135].
14 But see also Case AT.39759 – ARA Foreclosure, published 11
October 2016 where an Austrian waste management company
operating on a non-for-profit basis was held to be an undertaking
for the purposes of Article 102 TFEU. Here a competitive market
was likely to materialise if the dominant entity had not prevented
access to the infrastructure.
15 Montessori (n 1), [136-141].
16 Montessori (n 1), [141].
17 See H Hofmann and C Micheau, State Aid Law of the European
Union (OUP 2016), Part IV (3) and page 395: “There is a well-
entrenched praetorian obiter dictum in this respect, according to
which a Member State may not plead provisions, practices or
circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to
justify a failure to comply with its obligations under EU law.”
18 Montessori (n 1), [95-100].
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possible to identify retroactively the nature of the ac-
tivities that were being carried on at the specific lo-
cation in order to determine whether the tax exemp-
tion should have applied. In paragraph 106 (Montes-
sori), theGeneralCourtmakes apotentially far-reach-
ing point in cases where it is difficult to separate out
economic andnon-economic activities, the European
Commission cannot assume a presumption of State
aid. Yet, this seems to be what the European Com-
mission did in this case.
TheGeneral Court agreedwith theEuropeanCom-
mission that the latter could not impose obligations
on a Member State to recover illegal State aid where
objectively, and absolutely, it was impossible to im-
plement the obligation.19 In so doing, the General
Court appears to see this as a difficult case, where the
ruling is based upon the specific factual situation,
since the Court confirmed the existing case law that
it does not amount to absolute impossibility to argue
that recovery may be difficult due to political, legal
or practical reasons,20 or due to the high number of
aid recipients.21 The deference shown to the Euro-
pean Commission by the General Court is quite re-
markable. In deciding upon the impossibility to re-
cover point, theEuropeanCommissiondoesnot have
amargin of discretion toworkwith, which is protect-
ed by a limited judicial review (as is the situation
when assessing the compatibility of State aid with
EU law). Rather the impossibility issue is an objec-
tive notion that should be subject to full judicial con-
trol by the General Court. Thus the question arises
as to whether this situation in Italy is an example of
an objective justification to satisfy the impossibility
standard, setting a precedent, or whether the Gener-
al Court is applying a different standard of review of
the European Commission powers as regards the de-
terminants of the impossibility to recover State aid.
The General Court reached this position because
neither the public register of land ownership, nor the
tax databases allowed the tax authorities to identify
whether the activity was economic or non-econom-
ic, even where the entities were themselves not clas-
sified as commercial entities. The tax exemption pro-
visions applied to all of the activities of non-commer-
cial entities, when they were carrying out primarily
non-economic activities.
This formal approach to categorisingnon-econom-
ic activity appears to go against the grain of the es-
tablished case lawwhich looks to function over form.
These cases are unusual, but are part of increased in-
stances of examples where hybridisation and com-
mercialisation of public and non-economic entities
may in fact involve an element of mixed activities,
or where the State starts to charge for services previ-
ouslyofferedas free, public goods,whichmaychange
the nature of the activity for the purposes of EU eco-
nomic law. Each case appears to turn on its own facts,
with an inquiry as to the nature of the activity of the
entity primarily fulfilling public and/or social func-
tions.
The Court also dismissed the challenges to the
findings that there was no State aid. Particular atten-
tion is paid to the legal situation of the ecclesiastic
exemptions. The GC placed emphasis upon the for-
mal requirement that under Italian law, ecclesiasti-
cal institutions could only retain their status if they
did not carry out commercial activities.
VI. Conclusions
The rulings in Ferraci andMontessori are instructive
of how the door to the European Courts can be edged
open for third parties to register complaints on how
the European Commission has conducted a State aid
investigation. But, unsurprisingly, they do not offer
up any hope that the European Courts will interfere
with the role of the European Commission, especial-
ly its discretion to determine what is legally possible
and practicable when it comes to recovery of State
aid. It is also interesting that the Court was not will-
ing to pursue a broad effects-based approach to the
impact of the tax exemptions in what was a compet-
itive market, but was willing to go along with up-
holding a form-based national approach where his-
torical attachments to principles of solidarity play a
significant role in determining the line between eco-
nomic and non-economic activities.
19 Montessori (n 1), [83].
20 Montessori (n 1), [91].
21 Montessori (n 1), [92]. See Case C-441/06 Commission v France
[2007] ECLI-616; Case C-214 Commission v Italy [2005]
ECLI-440.
